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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to consider how the 
Conservative Liberal-Democrats Coalition’s so-called 
“immigration cap” will impact on Scotland. The immigration 
cap is a set of not yet specified policies (working mainly 
through the points-based immigration system) aimed at 
lowering net-migration to the UK primarily by lowering 
immigration. While the UK Government wants to reduce net-
migration to the UK, the Scottish Government wants to 
maintain a historically high level of net-migration in Scotland 
in part to achieve its population growth target and to ensure 
labour force growth.  The two levels of government are 
pursuing policies that clearly conflict, since lowering net-
migration to the UK will also likely lower net-migration to 
Scotland. 
 
 
  
The UK “Immigration Cap”: implications for 
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1.   Introduction 
The Conservative Liberal-Democrats Coalition, led by David 
Cameron, is committed to reducing net-migration in the UK 
from "the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands" 
by the end of their first parliament. Net-migration is the 
difference between the number of immigrants (those coming 
to the UK) and the number of emigrants (those leaving the 
UK). Consequently, lower immigration and/or higher 
emigration will decrease net-migration. Since it is unlikely 
that the current administration wants more people (at least 
British citizens) to leave the UK, the focus on delivering on 
this promise lies with putting policies in place that lead to a 
much lower level of immigration in coming years. As a 
group, these policies, which are still at the “consultation” 
stage have become known in the media and political circles 
as the so-called “immigration cap”. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to consider how the 
immigration cap will impact on Scotland. While the UK 
Government wants to reduce net-migration to the UK, the 
Scottish Government wants to maintain a historically high 
level of net-migration in part to achieve its population growth 
target and ensure labour force growth. For obvious reasons, 
one might expect net-migration at a UK-level to be positively 
correlated with net-migration at Scotland-level.  If this is the 
case, then the two levels of government are pursuing 
policies that clearly conflict, since lowering net-migration to 
the UK will also lower net-migration to Scotland. Immigration 
is a “reserved power” with the devolved administrations, 
such as the Scottish Government, only having a minor role 
in shaping immigration policy.  
 
In February 2005, the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke 
outlined a “five year plan” aimed at changing fundamentally 
the way immigration to the United Kingdom is managed (see 
Mosca and Wright, 2009). Central to this plan is the 
adoption of a “points-based system” (PBS), where 
applicants are allotted points or “scored” for possessing 
human capital characteristics that make them more 
employable, such as education, age and previous earnings. 
If some threshold level of points is achieved (which can be 
varied), then the individual is allowed to immigrate to the UK 
(conditional on satisfactory security checks). When fully 
operational, the PBS will eventually replace the system that 
includes over 80 ways to immigrate to the UK. It is 
acknowledged that manipulating the details of the PBS will 
be the main vehicle by which the UK government will 
attempt to reduce immigration levels. 
 
The effectiveness of the government’s approach to reducing 
immigration will depend on what fraction of the potential 
pool of immigrants the PBS applies to. As is documented 
below, a sizeable share of immigrants to the UK (and 
Scotland) come from member states of the European Union. 
There are no restrictions on movement from the other 
member states—citizens of these countries are free to live 
in the UK. In addition, with the exception of Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens, they are free to work here too. Likewise, 
a non-trivial share of immigrants are in fact British citizens. 
These immigrants may be individuals who emigrated from 
the UK earlier in their lives but have decided to return. They 
may also be foreign-born individuals who have obtained 
citizenship via their parents and/or grandparents. The PBS 
also does not apply to refugees and family class immigrants 
(e.g. immigration tied to marriage). Given these exclusions, 
it is unclear what the scope of the PBS is to seriously lower 
immigration levels to the UK. 
 
2.   Net-migration, immigration and emigration 
As a starting point, it is not unreasonable to argue that over 
time net-migration in the UK is correlated with net-migration 
in Scotland. Figure 1 shows the trend in UK net-migration 
from 1964 to 2010. Note that migration statistics for the UK 
before 1964 are of notoriously low quality so are not 
included in our discussion (see Hatton, 2005). Figure 2 
shows net-migration to Scotland from 1951 to 2010. Note 
that for Scotland net-migration also includes migration flows 
to and from the other countries of the UK. It is clear that 
these two series are highly correlated in a statistical sense.  
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Figure 1:  Net-migration - United Kingdom, 1964-2010  
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
 
 
Figure 2:  Net-migration - Scotland, 1950-2010  
 
 
Source:  General Register Office for Scotland (GROS) 
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Figure 3:  Net-migration rate (per 10,000 population) - Scotland and United Kingdom, 1951 (1964)-2010  
 
 
Source:  GROS and ONS 
 
 
In fact, in the 1964-2010, period the zero-order correlation is 
+0.85. 
 
Figure 3 shows the “net-migration rate” for the UK and 
Scotland. This rate is the number of net-migrants per 
10,000. It is a useful measure since it controls for the scale 
effect generated by the fact that the UK population (c. 62 
million) is around twelve times larger than the Scottish 
population (c. 5.3 million). The figure suggests that in a 
relative sense, emigration exceeded immigration by a much 
greater extent in Scotland compared to the UK in most of 
this period. However, since around 2004, when ten Central 
and Eastern European countries joined the EU, the net-
migration rate in Scotland has been higher than for the UK 
as a whole. However, these two series are still highly 
correlated with the zero-order correlation being +0.79 in the 
1964-2010 period. 
 
 
Table 1:  Immigration, emigration and net-migration - United Kingdom, thousands, 2004-2010 
 
 (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Period Immigration Emigration  Net-migration 
2004/2005 596 336 260 
2005/2006 565 388 177 
2006/2007 596 387 208 
2007/2008 571 375 196 
2008/2009 563 397 166 
2009/2010 572 346 226 
    
2004-2010 3463 2229 1,233 
Average 577 372 206 
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
R
at
e
 p
e
r 
1
0
,0
0
0
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
UK Scotland
Vol.35 No.2, pp.54-61. 
 
Figure 4:  Immigration and emigration - United Kingdom, 1964-2010 
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Immigration and emigration - Scotland, 1964-2010 
 
  
 
Source:  GROS 
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Figure 4 shows immigration and emigration totals to the UK 
in the 1964-2010 period. Figures 5 gives the same 
estimates for Scotland. Immigration to the UK and 
immigration to Scotland are highly correlated, with the zero-
order correlation being +0.94. The statistical relationship 
between emigration from the UK and emigration from 
Scotland is not as strong. The relationship is clearly positive 
with a zero-order correlation of +0.68. 
 
This descriptive analysis indicates that net-migration, 
immigration and emigration at the UK-level and the 
Scotland-level are highly correlated in a statistical sense. In 
research not reported here, we have constructed a 
statistical model that explains current levels of net-migration 
in Scotland in terms of the past levels of immigration and 
emigration in Scotland and the UK. This model is quite 
accurate in terms of predicting past trends. More generally, 
it provides more rigorous evidence suggesting that UK and 
Scotland net-migration are related in a casual sense. 
 
Table 1 gives the net-migration, immigration and emigration 
totals for the UK for the period 2004-2010. An examination 
of this table confirms that it is incorrect to conclude (as is 
routinely done in the media) that net-migration is increasing 
because immigration is increasing. Net-migration increased 
between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 because emigration 
decreased — immigration actually decreased during this 
period. The same is the case for the period 2008/09 to 
2010/11. 
 
Table 2 gives the net-migration, immigration and emigration 
totals in Scotland for the more recent period 2004-2010. As 
mentioned above, the situation is more complicated in 
Scotland compared to the UK since in addition to “overseas” 
immigrants and emigrants there are immigrants from and 
emigrants to the rest-of-the-UK. In addition, the way 
migration statistics are compiled, the migration of armed 
forces personal, prisoners and asylum seekers are 
considered as a separate adjustment. In the period 2004-
2010, about 44% of immigrants to Scotland came from 
overseas. In the same period, 38% of emigrants from 
Scotland moved overseas. In other words, based on the 
past, less than half of the immigrants to Scotland would fall 
under the PBS according to the current rules. 
 
 
Table 2:  Immigration, emigration and net-migration - Scotland, 2004-2010 
 
 Immigration Emigration Net-Migration 
Period UK Oversea
s 
Total UK Oversea
s 
Total Total Adjust-
ment(*) 
Total  
Adjusted 
2004/2005 57,342 35,400 92,742 44,835 28,100 72,935 19,807 -511 19,296 
2005/2006 53,335 42,200 95,535 44,413 29,500 73,913 21,622 -455 21,167 
2006/2007 51,546 37,800 89,346 42,697 21,000 63,697 25,649 1,162 26,811 
2007/2008 53,327 38,500 91,827 41,818 30,800 72,618 19,209 744 19,953 
2008/2009 45,407 42,700 88,107 41,285 25,200 66,485 21,622 49 21,671 
2009/2010 46,968 46,100 93,068 43,535 24,600 68,135 24,933 35 24,968 
          
2004-2010 307,925 242,700 550,625 258,583 159,200 417,783 132,842 1,024 133,866 
Average 51,321 40,450 91,771 43,097 26,533 69,631 22,140 171 22,311 
 
*This total includes movements to and from the armed forces, asylum seekers and prisoners. 
Source: General Register Office for Scotland 
 
3.  Citizenship mix of immigrants 
Figure 6 shows the “citizenship mix” of immigration to the 
UK in the period 1991-2009. In 2009 (the most recently 
available estimate), 18.6% of immigrants were British 
citizens; 28.4% were EU citizens; and 53% were non-EU 
citizens. As the figure shows the share of immigrants who 
are British citizens steadily declined while the share of 
immigrants who are EU-citizens increased sharply after the 
major enlargement of the EU in 2004. From 2004 onwards, 
there has been a slight decline in the share of immigrants 
who are non-EU citizens. However, non-EU citizens are the 
biggest group of immigrants to the UK. 
 
The PBS does not apply to immigrants who are British 
citizens or EU citizens. Therefore, at most, it currently 
applies to about half of immigrants. As a thought exercise, 
assume that the PBS was in place since 2004. Assume 
further that it was effective at reducing non-EU citizenship 
immigration to zero. Table 1 shows that in the period 2004-
2010 net-migration in the UK averaged +206,000 per year. 
Arithmetic suggests that a 50% reduction in immigration 
corresponds to a net-migration of around -80,000 per year. 
Likewise, a 25% reduction in immigration gives a net-
migration of around +60,000 per year. It is clear that the 
PBS has the potential to reduce net-migration to “tens of 
thousands” by severely curtailing the immigration of 
individuals with non-EU citizenship. 
 
Figure 7 shows the “citizenship mix” of overseas 
immigration to Scotland in the period 1991-2009. In 2009, 
the citizenship mix of overseas immigrants to Scotland was 
different to that of the UK as a whole. More specifically 25%
Vol.35 No.2, pp.54-61. 
 
Figure 6:  Citizenship of Immigrants (% of total) - United Kingdom, 1991-2009   
 
 
Source:  ONS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Citizenship of Overseas Immigrants (% of total) - Scotland, 1991-2009   
 
 
Source:  GROS  
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Figure 8:  Adjusted net-migration - Scotland, 2005-2010  
 
 
Source:  GROS and authors' calculations (see text) 
 
 
 
of immigrants were British citizens; 39% were EU citizens; 
and 36% were non-EU citizens. The key difference is that 
36% of non-EU citizens is considerably lower than 53% for 
the UK. As Figure 7, shows there is considerable year-to 
year volatility in the citizenship mix of immigration. However, 
when the period 2004-2009 is considered as a whole the 
difference persists. More specifically, 56.5% of immigrants 
to the UK were non-EU citizens compared to 43.3% of 
overseas immigrants to Scotland.  
 
Figure 8 shows the actual level of net-migration in Scotland 
for the period 2005-2010 taken from Table 2. As a further 
thought exercise, the figure also shows what the level of 
net-migration would be under two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, the government is successful are reducing 
immigration to the UK from “outside the EU” to zero. In the 
second scenario, they are successful at reducing 
immigration to the UK from “overseas” to zero. In these 
calculations, it is assumed that migration flows to and from 
the rest-of-the-UK remain the same. It is clear from the 
discussion above that it would not be possible to achieve 
such reductions for several reasons. However, the 
scenarios do provide some indication of the range of 
variation in net-migration that could be brought about 
through the PBS.  
Reducing immigration from countries outside the EU would 
result in a considerable reduction in net-migration in each of 
these periods. Between 2005 and 2010 the net-migration 
averaged +22,311 per year. Driving immigration from 
countries outside the EU to zero (not surprising) results in a 
net-migration of +6,644 per year. Likewise, driving 
immigration to zero from overseas countries, results in a 
net-migration of -18,139 per year. By any standards, both 
represent sizeable reductions in net-migration. 
 
4.   Concluding comments 
It is well established that Scottish population momentum is 
moving in the direction of rapid aging and decline (see 
Lisenkova and Wright, 2009). Population decline goes hand 
in hand with labour force decline. For most of the past 
decade, deaths have exceeded births, and it has been only 
through positive net-migration that both the labour force and 
general population have grown (see Wright, 2008). 
Research carried out by the Fraser of Allander Institute 
suggests that an annual net-migration of around 20,000 is 
needed to counteract some the negative macroeconomic 
consequences (such as lower economic growth) generated 
by a “shrinking” labour force decline, (Lisenkova et al, 
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2010). This suggested level of net-migration is no too 
different to what has occurred in recent years (see Table 2). 
It is clear from the simple analysis carried out in this paper, 
that the UK Government’s desire to significantly lower net-
migration to the UK, through lower levels of immigration, has 
the potential to reduce net-migration in Scotland to levels 
well below +20,000. 
 
This conclusion however is based on the assumption that 
the other flows of migrants would not change if the 
immigration of non-EU citizens was reduced. This seems 
unlikely. Even if the UK Government was successful at 
reducing the immigration of non-EU citizens, the immigration 
of EU-citizens and British citizens could increase to make up 
the difference. This substitution is more likely if immigration 
is predominately a response to employment and economic 
opportunities. In the case of Scotland, this difference could 
also be made up by an increase in immigration from the 
rest-of-the-UK. Put simply, if the decrease in immigrants of 
one type (i.e. non-EU citizens) results in an increase in 
immigrants of another type (i.e. EU-citizens and British 
citizens), then all that will be achieved is a change in the 
citizenship mix of immigration with no decrease in net-
migration levels. If this is the case then trying to reduce 
immigration solely through the making it “tougher” 
(impossible?) to immigrate to the UK via the PBS will not be 
successful.   
 
 
 
____________________ 
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